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Successive Applications for the Writ
of Habeas Corpus
ALAN F. N. POOLE*
Until comparatively recently an application for a writ of habeas
corpus was considered to be a civil matter in that it concerned
personal freedom. It has now been decided in both England and
Canada that this is not always true. Important constitutional impli-
cations were shown to result from the distinction between civil and
criminal matters in the case of in re Storgoff,l where a British
Columbia statute providing for appeals in habeas corpus proceedings
was held to be unconstitutional insofar as it applied to convictions
under the Criminal Code.
A "criminal matter" was defined by Viscount Cave L.C. in
re Clifford and O'Sullivan,2 where he said the case
must involve the consideration of some charge of crime, that is to say,
of an offence against the public law; and that charge must have been
preferred or be about to be preferred before some court or judicial
tribunal having or claiming jurisdiction to impose punishment for the
offence or alleged offence.3
In elaborating this, Viscount Simon L.C. said in Amand v. Home
Secretary
4
It is the nature and character of the proceeding in which habeas corpus
is sought which provides the test. If the matter is one the direct outcome
of which may be the trial of the applicant and his possible punishment
for an alleged offence by a court claiming jurisdiction to do so, the
matter is criminal. This is the true effect of the two conditions formulated
by Viscount Cave in re Clifford and O'Sullivan.
In in re Storgoff the applicant had been convicted and imprisoned
under the Criminal Code, and six of the seven judges who heard the
appeal in the Supreme Court of Canada held that this was a criminal
matter and approved the definition given above. The argument before
the court was that the right to liberty was a civil right, and therefore
the Provincial Legislature was competent to pass such legislation,
*Mr. Poole is in the third year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 [1945] S.C.R. 526.
2 [1922] 2 A.C. 570.
3 Id. at 580.
4 [1943] A.C. 147, at p. 156.
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but this was rejected by the court 5 However, Rand J.6 held that
the Provincial Legislatures do have authority to legislate with regard
to habeas corpus in connection with provincial offences, and there
is also authority for this in the dissenting judgment of Rinfret C.J.
The right to successive applications appears superficially to be
equivalent to an appeal, but apart from judicial dicta that each
application must be heard de novo, there are two theoretical dis-
tinctions. First, the second and subsequent applications may be made
to courts of a jurisdiction coordinate with that of the one to which
the first application was made. Secondly, if a writ is granted, the
person against whom it issues has no appeal, but must make a
return to the writ as directed, and has no appeal if a discharge is
ordered, whereas an applicant who has failed can try again elsewhere.
It is inconsistent with the normal concept of a right of appeal that
it should be available to only one of the parties to a case.
Since no right of appeal in a habeas corpus proceeding exists
at common law and none has been provided by the Dominion Parlia-
ment the right to make successive applications is of great importance.
There are two situations in which such a right might be exercised:
when a writ has been refused on a previous application, and when
a writ has issued but on the return the prisoner has been remanded.
The main controversy has centered on whether there is a right
to apply successively to individual judges and, in England, to different
courts; recent decisions have denied the existence of such a right
at all.
The English authorities will be discussed first.
Originally the writ only issued from the Court of Queen's Bench
in term, but in 1679 the Habeas Corpus Act7 was passed authorising
any court, and any judge during vacation, to issue the writ.
An early judicial authority for a right to apply to each court
in turn is found in ex p. Partington,8 where Parke B. said
the defendant has a right to the opinion of every court as to the
propriety of his imprisonment. 9
The issue was the interpretation of a statute relating to the attach-
ment of debtors, and Partington was trying to obtain his release
from prison under its provisions. The dictum just quoted was made
in the Court of Exchequer; writs had already been issued by the
Court of Queen's Bench and the Lord Chief Baron in chambers,
but a discharge had in each case been refused. Only the Queen's
5 See D. M. Gordon, (1945) 23 Can. Bar Rev. 595, for a demonstration
of the fallacies in this contention.
6 [1945] S.C.R. 526, at p. 583.
7 31 Car. 2, c. 2.
8 (1845) 13 M. & W. 679, 153 E.R. 284.
9 Id. at 683, 286.
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Bench hearing is reported,' o and it contains no reference to successive
applications.
Successive applications to different courts were possible because
the doctrine of res judicata did not apply. The explanation for this
is in the nature of the writ itself; the only way of challenging a
decision of a court in banc was by a writ of error, which could
not apply to the prerogative writs as no formal judgment was ever
issued in proceedings on them."
The first authority for the right to apply to each judge in turn
is found in the speech of Lord Halsbury in Cox v. Hakes,12 which
commences with a statement of general principle:
My Lords, probably no more important or serious question has ever
come before your Lordships' House. For a period extending as far back
as our legal history the writ of habeas corpus has been regarded as one
of the most important safeguards of the liberty of the subject. If upon
the return to that writ it was adjudged that no legal ground was made
justifying detention the consequence was immediate release from custody.
If release was refused, a person detained might - see ex p. Partington
- make a fresh application to every judge or every Court in turn, and
each Court or judge was bound to consider the question independently
and not to be influenced by the previous decisions refusing discharge.
Though a dictum from Lord Halsbury is entitled to the greatest
respect, the authority of this is weakened by no other member of
the House stating the same principle, and by some of them con-
firming the right to apply to separate courts only, making no
mention of judges. In addition, the case itself concerned the right
to appeal, not to make successive applications; the procedure was
only considered in order to show the case did not come within the
English Judicature Act.
The main authority for the right to go from judge to judge is
Eshugbayi Eleko v. Governor General of Nigeria.'3 Lord Hailsham,
in delivering the opinion of the Judicial Committee, said' 4
if it be conceded that any judge has jurisdiction to order the writ to
issue, then in the view of their Lordships each judge is a tribunal to
which application can be made within the meaning of the rule, and every
judge must hear the application on the merits. It follows that, although
by the Judicature Acts the Courts have been combined in the one High
Court of Justice, each judge of that court still has jurisdiction to enter-
tain an application for the writ of habeas corpus in term time or vacation,
and that he is bound to hear and determine such an application on its
merits notwithstanding that some other judge has already refused a
similar application.
The issue came squarely before the English courts as a result
of the persistence of one Edward Thomas Hastings.15 After an un-
successful appeal from conviction he applied to a Divisional Court
of the Queen's Bench Division for a writ of habeas corpus, which
10 (1844) 6 Q.B. 649; 115 E.R. 244.
31 See Lord Goddard, (1949) 65 L.Q.R. 30.
12 (1890) 15 App. Cas. 506, at 514.
13 [1928] A.C. 459.
14 Id. at 468.
15 For a comment on the Hastings series of cases see S. A. de Smith,
(1959) 22 M.L.R. 184.
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was refused,' 6 and an appeal from this refusal was unsuccessful."
Hastings then applied to another Divisional Court of the Queen's
Bench Division, composed of three judges different from those who
had heard his first application; he relied on the same grounds and pro-
duced the same evidence.' 8 The Solicitor-General intervened on two
grounds, first, that an applicant has never had a right to go from
judge to judge except when the court is not sitting (i.e. in vacation),
secondly, in the alternative, that though an applicant has a right
to go from Court to Court, the union of the Courts by the Judicature
Act means that at most one application can be made to each Division.
Lord Parker C.J., after stating that the judgment represented the
opinion of the whole court, pointed out that the old courts always sat
in bane, and that no single judge could bind the whole Court. The
Act of 1679, where it was concerned with single judges, merely gave
them the power to hear applications in vacation, and even in the
early nineteenth century it was laid down that a single judge only
had power to issue the writ in vacation. 19 Lord Parker went on to
show that a second application could not be made to the same court
on the same facts since there had already been an exercise of judicial
discretion on the first application.20 In considering ex p. Partington
he noted an inconsistency in the reports of the judgement,21 but held
that all versions were consistent with the right to apply from judge
to judge only existing in vacation. In discussing the later authorities,
the Lord Chief Justice commented that in Cox v. Hakes Lord Hals-
bury was alone in stating the right was to go from judge to judge,
and held that he was not bound by the decision of the Privy Council
in Eleko v. Governor General. He therefore decided that prior to the
Judicature Act the right was to go from court to court. Since by
that Act a Divisional Court could exercise the jurisdiction of the old
Court sitting in banc, a subsequent application to the same division
would be refused on the grounds that a judicial discretion had already
been exercised.
This decision disposed of the application, but left open the ques-
tion whether there was a right to go from Division to Division as
distinct from Divisional Court to Divisional Court in the same
Division.
Four months later Hastings applied to a Divisional Court of the
Chancery Division.22 Vaisey J. held after the Judicature Acts the
different Divisions no longer exist as separate courts; there is only
6 Re Hastings, [19581 1 W.L.R. 372, 1 All E.R. 707.
17 The Times, 29 July 1958.
18 Re Hastings (No. 2), [19583 3 W.L.R. 768; [19593 1 Q.B. 358. The
W.L.R. does not contain the arguments of counsel.
19 Hobhouse's Case (1820), 3 B. & Ald. 420; 106 E.R. 716, per Abbott C.J.,
later Lord Tenterden, at 422, 717.
20 Quoting Parke B. in in re Cobbett (1845), 5 L.T.O.S. 130.
21 See also R. F. V. Heuston, (1950) 66 L.Q.R. 79.
22 Re Hastings (No. 8), [19593 Ch. 368, 2 W.L.R. 454.
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one High Court to which judges are appointed, though they are
assigned to different Divisions later. Harman J. held that an appli-
cant has no right to go from judge to judge during term time. An
appeal failed on the grounds that the Court of Appeal was not
empowered to hear appeals in a criminal cause or matter.23
The overall result of this Hastings series of cases is that the
only right in an application for habeas corpus is to apply once to
a Divisional Court in term time or to a single judge in vacation.
Assuming the principle in these decisions applies to Canada, since
there are no Divisions in Canadian Courts an application can only
be made once, and it must be made to a single judge.
An authority much relied on by the courts in in re Hastings is
the Irish case of The State (Dowling) v. Kingston.24 An application
for habeas corpus was made to the High Court, consisting of three
judges, which by a majority refused to grant it. Another application
was immediately made to the dissenting judge, who also refused. An
appeal taken on the first refusal to the Supreme Court failed, Fitz-
gibbon J. submitting the judgments in Cox v. Hakes to a detailed
analysis and deciding that Lord Halsbury had no authority for his
statement. He also considered that the Judicature Acts, passed to
simplify procedure, could not be considered to have allowed a suc-
cession of separate applications to each judge sitting as a separate
tribunal.
In none of these cases was an attempt made to distinguish
between making an application after a writ has been refused and
making an application after a writ has been granted but a discharge
refused. The State (Dowling) v. Kingston is the only case on the
first situation, the others all involve the second. At first sight the
two situations are quite different from each other, but it is possible
that at common law they both fall under the same principle, that
when an application has been made a judicial discretion has been
exercised and no subsequent attempt can be made. The effect of the
Hastings decisions is to apply this to individual judges.
Cases involving successive applications where a discharge has
been refused greatly outnumber those where the writ itself has been
refused. The reason may be that judges issue the writ almost as
a matter of course, preferring to wait for the return, when both
sides will be represented, to determine Wvhether the applicant should
be released. The writ cannot be obtained as of right, however, either
at common law or under statute, since there must be a probable and
reasonable ground of complaint.
In 1866 the Province of Canada passed "An Act for More
Effectually Securing the Liberty of the Subject,"25 section 6 of which
provided:
23 Be Hastings (No. 8), [1959] 1 W.L.R. 807.
24 [1937] I.R. 699.
25 29-30 Vict., c. 45.
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In case any person confined or restrained of his or her liberty... shall
be brought before the court in term time upon a writ of habeas corpus,
and shall be remanded to custody again upon the original order or
warrant of commitment... it shall and may be lawful for such person
to appeal from the decision or judgment of the said court, to the Court
of Error and Appeal ...
Patterson J.A. in in re Hall,26 decided before (ox v. Hakes, said that
a decision on appeal under this section would bind all courts of first
instance, and therefore the question of successive applications to
different courts was precluded by this section. This reasoning would
a fortiori apply to applications to different judges. He also pointed
out that the union by the Judicature Act of the old Courts into a
single Court made applications to different courts impossible.27
Since the Dominion Parliament has passed no legislation con-
cerning habeas corpus the 1866 Act still applies. However, in ex parte
Johnston, s the Ontario Court of Appeal held that after the 1913
Judicature Act abolishing the Divisional Courts there was no court
left to which an appeal in habeas corpus would lie.29 This immediately
removes one ratio for the decision in in re Hall, but does not affect
its relevance to the organization of the courts. Morden J.A., who
delivered the judgment of the Court of Appeal in ex p. Johnston,
assumed the law of Ontario was the same as that laid down in Eleo
v. Governor-General, and considered the appeals before him as if
they were subsequent applications after a discharge had been refused
made to him as an ex officio judge of the High Court. 0 He discussed
the decision in Re Hastings (No. 2) but did not follow it, pointing
out that Lord Parker C.J. did not consider himself bound by the
decision in Eleko 'v. Governor-General.
About three weeks after the decision in ex p. Johnston one of
the unsuccessful appellants obtained a second writ from Wilson J.,
and the return came before McRuer C.J.H.C. with the style of
cause ex parte Shane.31 Before hearing the application on its merits
the learned Chief Justice had to make a decision on the preliminary
objection that this was a return to the second writ issued to the
applicant, who only had a right to make one application. He held
that he was not bound by the decision in Eleko v. Governor-General,
and that, since under the provisions of section 12 (2) of the Judicature
Act 32 each judge exercises the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
when making a decision, no order could be made which was in-
consistent with that made by the judge to whom the first application
was made.
26 (1882), 8 O.A.R. 135, at p. 149.
27 On this point see also Taylor v. Scott (1898), 30 O.R. 475; Re Loo Len
(No. 2), [1924] 1 D.L.R. 910, (B.C.).
28 [1959] O.R. 322.
29 This decision avoids the awkward possibility of there being a right
of appeal in Ontario and Quebec but not in the other provinces, to which the
1866 Act did not apply.
30 This is impossible in England: see ex p. LeGros (1914), 30 T.L.R. 249.
31 [1959] O.R. 337.
32 R.S.O. 1960, c. 197.
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It is submitted that these two recent cases have still left some
doubt in the law. Ex p. Shane held that successive applications could
not be made, but Morden J.A. in ex p. Johnston assumed the law was
that laid down in Eleko v. Governor-General and allowed a successive
application. The point was decided in ex p. Shane, and not specifically
decided in ex p. Johnston, but the latter case was in the Court of
Appeal and the Court acted on a successive application. The hearing
of the application on its merits made no difference to the final result,
but the action of the Court of Appeal in hearing it is inconsistent
with the decision of McRuer C.J.H.C. that it does not exist. To sum
up, the Ontario authority in favour of the right to make successive
applications when a discharge has been refused is ex p. Johnston
in the Court of Appeal; the authorities against are ex p. Hall and
ex p. Shane, both in courts of first instance.
The three cases so far considered have dealt with applications
made after a writ has been granted and a discharge refused. The
distinction between this situation and one where the issue of the writ
has been refused was commented on in R. v. Gravesa3 Riddell J.
pointing out34 that the 1866 Act only dealt with cases where a writ
had been issued but a discharge had been refused, and that
the case of a refusal to grant a writ was not touched or effected by the
statute or the cases, and I think that the common law right of going
from Judge to Judge until either a writ is obtained or every judge has
refused still remains.
This was disregarded in ex p. Shane as being obiter.
Even if ex p. Shane is taken as refusing to allow successive
applications, a writ had been granted in that case, and it is therefore
of only persuasive authority, equal with that of the dictum of
Riddell J. quoted above, in connection with applications after a refusal
to issue the writ. The authorities on this situation, both from other
jurisdictions, are The State (Dowling) v. Kingston, and the general
principle that there has already been an exercise of a judicial
discretion.
It is therefore arguable that there still is a right to make
successive applications for habeas corpus, whether the writ itself has
been refused, or whether it has been issued but a discharge has been
refused. However, on the balance of authority, it is unlikely to
succeed.
If in the future such an argument is rejected by the courts,
an applicant still has a chance to obtain the writ after being refused
by the Provincial Courts. In in re Seeley35 the applicant failed to
obtain a writ in the New Brunswick courts and applied to Girouard J.
in chambers in the Supreme Court of Canada under what is now
section 57(1) of the Supreme Court Act.36 The writ was refused
33 (1910), 21 O.L.R. 329.
34 Id. at 359.
35 (1908), 41 S.C.R. 5.
36 R.S.C. 1952, c. 259.
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and he appealed unsuccessfully to the full court under section 57(2),
which allows an appeal whether a writ is refused or the prisoner
remanded. This practice was not mentioned in ex p. Shane.
Leaving aside matters of strict law, the right to successive
applications has been criticised on practical grounds. McRuer C.J.H.C.
in ex. p. Shane pointed out that it allows 31 separate applications, one
to each judge, to be made in Ontario. The Supreme Court of Canada
would add 9 to this total. The solution advocated by the judges them-
selves is a right to make a single application with a right to appeal
to the highest court. In contrast with the dictum of Lord Hasbury
in Cox v. Hakes, Mr. D. M. Gordon has written:S7
the power of prisoners to canvass the whole bench of Supreme Court
judges is an indefensible survival of archaic Ideas that seem to have
been based on a misapprehension from the first; and that the favourable
views of any judge shall outweigh the contrary views of all the rest
without any right of appeal by the Crown, is even more Indefensible.
The obvious course is for the legislature to limit application to one judge,
and to give both the prisoner and the Crown an appeal. Talk of such a
change infringing the liberty of the subject is only too obviously
nonsense.
37 (1945), 23 Can. Bar Rev. 595.
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